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Abstract
We define quantum-like probabilistic behaviour as behaviour which
is impossible to describe by using the classical probability model. We
discuss the conjecture that cognitive behaviour is quantum-like. There
is presented the scheme for an experimental test for quantum-like cog-
nitive behaviour based on a generalization of the famous Bell’s in-
equality. This generalization is an analogue of Bell’s inequality, but
for conditional probabilities. The use of conditional probabilities (in-
stead of simultaneous probability distributions for pairs of observables
in the original Bell’s inequality) gives the possibility to separate two
problems which are mixed in the original Bell’s framework: nonlocality
and nonclassical (quantum-like) probabilistic behaviour. Our inequal-
ity for conditional probabilities can be used for experiments with a
single system (so we need not to prepare pairs of correlated systems)
to find quantum-like behaviour. This possibility is extremely impor-
tant in cognitive sciences where it is practically impossible to prepare
pairs of precisely correlated cognitive systems. Thus the test of the
original Bell’s inequality in cognitive and social sciences, or psychology
is the problem of huge complexity. On the other hand, our test based
on an analogue of Bell’s inequality for conditional probabilities can be
easily performed in, e.g., psychological experiments or cognitive tasks.
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1 Introduction
It seems that the philosophic system of Whitehead [1]-[3] was the first at-
tempt to establish a quantum–mental (or more precisely mental→ quantum)
connection. In Whitehead’s philosophy of the organism “quantum” was some
feature of basic protomental elements of reality [1], especially p. 401-403.
See also A. Shimony [4] for modern reconsideration of quantum counterpart
of Whitehead’s philosophy of organism. Unfortunately, the main stream of
“quantum-mental” investigations was directed to quantum reductionism of
mental processes, see [5]-[19]. I do not want to criticize attempts to perform
quantum-reduction of mental processes – reduction of mind to quantum phys-
ical processes. It is clear that this is the great program of investigations and
it is too early to say anything. I just want to pay attention that, e.g., White-
head did not have in mind quantum physical reduction of mental processes
when he wrote about quantum protomental elements of reality. It is also
important to mention Bohr’s ideas on complementarity in physics, psychol-
ogy and other domains of science [20] (see [21] for detailed analysis). We
recall the well known fact that, in fact, N. Bohr “borrowed” the principle
of complemetarity from psychology. In particular, reading of “Principles of
Psychology” of W. James was very important for N. Bohr. But N. Bohr
neither had in mind quantum-reductionism. He just wanted to emphasize
that some fundamental principles of quantum mechanics can be valid out-
side of physics. The crucial for N. Bohr was the special information structure
of measurement processes in some domains of science which can differ essen-
tially from measurement processes in classical physics. We also pay attention
to a correspondence between W. Pauli and C. G. Jung. They neither come
to quantum-reductionist conclusions. We recall a practically forgotten paper
of V. Orlov [22]1 who proposed to use quantum logic to describe function-
ing of brain. Orlov was not looking for reduction of mental processes to
quantum physical processes. He considered brain as an information system
which can in principle use rules of quantum logic. And, finally, we mention
investigations of Bohm-Hiley-Pylkka¨nen [23]–[25] who proposed to apply the
formalism of quantum pilot wave (Bohmian mechanics) to mental processes.
They did not try to reduce mental processes to pilot waves coupled to quan-
tum particles composing the brain. BHP also considered brain as a special
information system which can be described by Bohmian mechanics (see [26],
[27] for a rather risky application of BHP-ideas).
I also think that the most profitable applications of quantum methods to
cognitive and social sciences and psychology can be obtained not via quan-
1which was written in a concentration camp in 60th and published a few years later.
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tum physical reduction, but by considering cognitive systems as a complex
information systems such that some laws of quantum theory can be applied to
these systems (at least with some modifications and generalizations). At this
point it is extremely important to understand: What is quantum mechan-
ics about?, see [28]. What kind of laws of nature are encoded in quantum
mathematical formalism? Despite one hundred years of development and
great applications of quantum theory, there are still no commonly accepted
answers to these questions. Quantum theory is characterized by a huge diver-
sity of interpretations, see [29]. My experience as an organizer of a series of
large conferences on foundations of quantum mechanics says that practically
everybody elaborated its own specific interpretation of quantum mechanics.
Even if people use the same name, e.g., Copenhagen interpretation, in real-
ity they can use extremely different versions. I think that this diversity of
interpretations is a sign of a deep crises in foundations of quantum mechanics.
Personally I use so called ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics
by which quantum mechanics gives us laws of transformation of probability
distributions for ensembles of physical systems. A. Einstein was one of the
strongest supporters of this interpretation, see also Margenau [30], Ballentine
[31]. If we use this interpretation then at the first sight quantum mechan-
ics does not differ from classical statistical physics which also gives laws of
transformation of probability distributions for ensembles of physical systems.
The crucial point is that laws of transformation of probability distributions
are different! The main exhibition of quantum probabilistic behaviour is the
interference of probabilities of alternatives which can be easily obtained in ex-
periments with quantum systems, e.g., in the well known two slit experiment.
This interference gives the experimental basis of the superposition principle.
The latter is one of the basic elements of a philosophic system of views to
the physical reality which we can call quantum mysticism. Roughly speak-
ing, since an electron can be in a superposition of states, but a car cannot,
there is a huge gap between domains of application of quantum and classical
probability. There is a rather common opinion that quantum randomness
differs crucially from classical randomness. (the first one is “irreducible” and
the second one is “reducible”, see, e.g., [32]); that quantum theory works in
microworld and classical in macroworld.
These views to quantum theory and especially probability play the fun-
damental role in the justification of quantum reductionism. Since laws of
quantum mechanics work only for quantum particles, if we try to apply these
laws to mental processes then we should reduce these processes to quantum
physical processes. Some supporters of quantum reductionism reply: “Not
everything is so trivial. We do not claim that there is no macroscopic physical
structures having quantum behaviour; consider, for example, Bose-Einstein
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condensate.” This is an interesting argument, but I cannot take its seriously.
Bose-Einstein condensate is a collective effect of quantum systems induced
by special “quantum conditions.” By using this example we just disappoint
ourselves and scientists working in neurophysiology, cognitive sciences and
psychology. In fact, we say to them:“You should look for these special quan-
tum conditions in brain!” (in particular, temperature, space and time scales).
I think that R. Penrose is more fair when he wrote that an individual neu-
ron could not be in superposition of two states and therefore we cannot use
quantum mechanics on neuronal level [6]. And in his quantum-mental in-
vestigations R. Penrose operated on fantastically deep microlevel – level of
quantum gravity. Roughly speaking consciousness is generated by collapses
of mass superpositions. Of course, there is the huge gap between the levels of
quantum cosmology and neurophysiology... Quantum reductionism is totally
incompatible with modern neurophysiology which is based on the neuronal
model.
It seems that “quantum mysticism” (and, in particular, mystery of quan-
tum probability) is one of the main sources of quantum reductionism for
mental processes.
Recently the problem of quantum probabilities was essentially clarified
[33]-[35] when the interference of probabilities was obtained by using classi-
cal ensemble probabilities (and without to appeal to the formalism of Hilbert
space). In this series of papers there was developed a calculus of contex-
tual probabilities – probabilities depending on contexts. Contexts are com-
plexes of physical, cognitive, social, psychological conditions. It was observed
that laws of transformation of contextual probabilities coincide (under some
conditions) with laws induced by the quantum formalism. But contextual
probability is a classical ensemble probability. The crucial point is that con-
text dependence of probabilities can be nontrivial. In this case we cannot
use “absolute” context-independent probability measure P. We call nontriv-
ial contextual probabilistic behaviour (of physical, cognitive, social systems)
quantum-like.
Contextuality of probabilities has no direct coupling with microworld.
Even ensembles of macroscopic systems can demonstrate nontrivial contex-
tual probabilistic behaviour. Thus quantum-like behaviour can be in princi-
ple found not only for, e.g., electrons or photons, but also for, e.g., human
beings or some ensembles of neurons.2
In [36] it was proposed to investigate probabilistic quantum-like behaviour
for cognitive and social systems. As the first step we should really show
2We dot speak about a quantum-like superposition of states of an individual neuron;
in our approach interference of probabilities and superposition are ensemble features.
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that cognitive systems may exhibit quantum-like behaviour. This can be
proved only by using experiments (in cognitive science, psychology,...). Thus
we need experimental tests of quantum-like behaviour. In [36] I proposed
a simple test of quantum-like behaviour based on interference of probabili-
ties for two questions a and b which can be asked to people. In [37] there
were performed experiments with students giving preliminary confirmation of
quantum-like behaviour of people. Up to now there have not been performed
experiments with animals, fishes or insects. Thus there is no experimental
data on quantum-like behaviour for these biological organisms. It is natu-
ral to suppose that only biological organism having a rather high level of
mental development can exhibit quantum-like behaviour. For example, we
can speculate that insects would always behave classically. We can measure
numerically the level of quantum-like behaviour by the magnitude of the
coefficient interference of probabilities, see [36].
In this paper I propose a new more complex test of quantum-like be-
haviour for people (but similar experiments can be also performed for ani-
mals) based on three questions (or cognitive tasks) a, b, c. This test is based
on a generalization of the famous Bell’s inequality, see, e.g., [38]. This gener-
alization is an analogue of Bell’s inequality, but for conditional probabilities.
It was derived in [39]. The use of conditional probabilities (instead of simul-
taneous probability distributions for pairs of observables in the original Bell’s
inequality) gives the possibility to separate two problems which are mixed
in the original Bell’s framework: nonlocality and nonclassical (quantum-like)
probabilistic behaviour. J. Bell (who was nonlocal realist) wanted to show
that quantum world is nonlocal: by performing a measurement on one of cor-
related particles we change the state of the second particle. We are not inter-
ested in the use of Bell’s inequality for investigation of mental nonlocality.3
We are very pragmatic. We “just” want to show that some cognitive sys-
tems are quantum-like. This will give us the possibility to to apply powerful
methods of quantum mechanics to cognitive and social sciences, psychology,
economy,....
Our inequality for conditional probabilities can be used for experiments
with a single cognitive system to find quantum-like behaviour (so we need
not to prepare pairs of “correlated cognitive systems”). This possibility is
extremely important in cognitive sciences where it is practically impossible
to prepare pairs of precisely correlated cognitive systems. Thus the test of
the original Bell’s inequality in cognitive and social sciences, or psychology
is the problem of huge complexity. On the other hand, our test based on
an analogue of Bell’s inequality for conditional probabilities can be easily
3We do not reject such a possibility , see, e.g., [40] on interesting results in this direction.
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performed in psychological experiments or cognitive tasks for animals and
people.
We hope that this paper will attract attention of scientists working in
experimental cognitive science, psychology, social sciences and that there will
be really found violations of an analogue of Bell’s inequality for conditional
probabilities presented in this paper.
2 Description of test
The main aim of our paper is to attract attention of experimenters work-
ing in cognitive science, psychology, sociology to our test of quantum-like
behaviour. Therefore we would not like to disturb these people by mathe-
matical derivations and discussions on the analogy with quantum physics.
The test by itself is very simple and we present it here, see section 3 for
derivations and discussions.
Let a, b, c be three questions which can asked to people (it can also be
some cognitive tasks for people or animals). The answers “yes” and “no” are
encoded by +1 and -1, respectively.
1). We collected an ensemble S of people which are “prepared” in the
same mental state with respect to these questions.4
The crucial in our test is that an ensemble S should be homogeneous with
respect to questions a, b, c in the sense that for all questions the probabilities
of answers are equal:
P(u = +1) = P(v = −1) =
1
2
, where u = a, b, c.
In our experimental test we consider frequencies instead of probabilities,
P(u = +1) ≈ ν(u = +1), u = a, b, c, where:
ν(u = +1) =
the number of people who answered “yes” to the question u
the total number of people in S
2). We split S into two subensembles U and V containing equal numbers
of people.
3). The question b is asked to people from the ensemble U and the ques-
tion c is asked to people from the ensemble V. Then we select in the ensemble
U people who answered “yes” and people who answered “no”. Correspond-
ing subensembles are denoted by symbols U b+ and U
b
−
, respectively. We do
the same with people from V, and get subensembles U c+ and U
c
−
.
4For example, if questions a, b, c about politics then it is assumed that people from S
live in the same country, have the same social and cultural level, the same age, sex and so
on.
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4). We ask the question a to people belonging the ensembles U b+, V
c
+ and
the question c to people belonging the ensemble U b
−
. By counting frequencies
we find approximately conditional probabilities; for example, P(a = +1/b =
+1) ≈ ν(a = +1/b = +1), where
ν(a = +1/b = +1) =
the number of people who answered “yes” to a
the total number of people in U b+
Our text of quantum-like behaviour is based on the violation of the follow-
ing inequality (an analogue of Bell’s inequality for conditional probabilities),
see section 3:
P(a = +1/b = +1) +P(c = +1/b = −1) ≥ P(a = +1/c = +1) (1)
If this inequality is violated than people (or animals) behave in the
quantum-like way with respect to questions a, b, c.
In statistical investigation we should fix small δ > 0 and probability p ≈ 1.
Calculate
∆(a, b, c) = ν(a = +1/c = +1)− ν(a = +1/b = +1)− ν(c = +1/b = −1)
and apply the criteria χ2 for the hypothesis that ∆(a, b, c) ≥ δ.
3 Inequality for conditional probabilities
3.1. Quantum-like probabilistic behaviour. Since the first days of
quantum mechanics there is intensively discussed the problem of realistic
description – the possibility to use in quantum mechanics the same realistic
viewpoint to observables as in classical physics: values of physical observables
as properties of objects. We recall that quantum mechanics is a statistical
theory and it cannot say anything about behaviour of individual quantum
systems (at least we use such a viewpoint to quantum mechanics in this
paper). It seems that first time the rigorous mathematical definition of sta-
tistical realism was given by J. Bell [38]. By analogy with quantum theory
we give the following definition:
Definition 1. Let O = {a, b, . . . c} be a family of observables (physical, or
cognitive, or psychological, or social). This family permits the realistic statis-
tical description if there exists a Kolmogorov probability space K = (Ω,F ,P)
such that all observables belonging to O can be represented by random vari-
ables on K.
Here Ω is an ensemble of, e.g., physical systems, or neurons, or neural
networks, or animals, or people, or collectives of people,... (in mathematical
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model Ω is an ideal infinite ensemble); F is a σ-field of subsets of Ω and P is
a probability measure on F . We recall that conditional probabilities in the
Kolmogorov model are defined by the Bayes’ formula:
P(a = a1/b = b1) =
P(a = a1, b = b1)
P(b = b1)
.
Definition 2. A family of observables O = {a, b, . . . c} which does not
permit the realistic statistical description is called quantum-like.
Let O is a quantum-like family of observables and observations are per-
formed on some class of systems (e.g., physical systems, or neurons, or neural
networks, or animals, or people, or collectives of people,...). We say that such
systems exhibit quantum-like behaviour. Our aim is to present an experimen-
tal test for quantum-like behaviour for three observables, a, b, c.
In quantum mechanics J. Bell studied similar (but not the same!) prob-
lem. He considered the famous Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen experiment [41].5
There are prepared pairs of correlated systems ω = (s, s′). Let a, b, c be three
dichotomous observables on s and a′, b′, c′ corresponding observables on s′.
For example a, b, c are measurements on s of spin projections corresponding
to angles θ1, θ2, θ3 and a
′, b′, c′ are spin projections corresponding to same an-
gles θ1, θ2, θ3, but the latter observations are performed on s
′. It is supposed
that we have precise anti-correlations:
a(s) = −a′(s′), b(s) = −b′(s′), c(s) = −c′(s′). (2)
Then J. Bell proposed to consider pair vise correlations of variables u =
a, b, c and v = a′, b′, c′ and starting with assumption of realism and locality
he proved inequality for these correlations. This inequality is violated by
quantum correlations.
We remark that in quantum theory measurements have huge disturbance
effect therefore we cannot measure, e.g., a on s without to disturb s. Thus
we should use different s for different measurements (for, e.g., a and b). For a
single system s we cannot perform the simultaneous measurement of a and b;
we cannot find the simultaneous probability distribution of a and b and their
correlation. Therefore Einstein, Podolsky and Rosen proposed to consider
pairs of correlated particles and therefore J. Bell was successful with his test
for correlations (for observations on correlated particles).
We would like to study observables in cognitive science, psychology, soci-
ology. In these frameworks it seems to be impossible to realize preparations of
5In fact, the Bohm-version of the original EPR-experiment. In the EPR-experiment
there are considered continuous variables, position and momentum; in the EPR-Bohm-
experiment dichotomous variables, e.g., spin projections.
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ensembles which would satisfy to the condition of precise (anti)-correlation.
Therefore we need Bell’s like tests for measurements performed on a single
system. Of course, such a framework has nothing to do with investigations on
mental nonlocalty. We study only quantum-like behaviour of mental systems.
3.2. Wigner inequality. We shall use the following simple mathemat-
ical result:
Theorem 1. (Wigner inequality) Let a, b, c = ±1 be arbitrary dichoto-
mous random variables on a single Kolmogorov space K. Then the following
inequality holds true.
P(a = +1, b = +1) +P(b = −1, c = +1) ≥ P(a = +1, c = +1) (3)
The proof of this theorem in purely mathematical framework can be found
e.g., in my book [42], p. 89-90. However, the inequality (3) is, in fact, the well
Wigner’s inequality, see [43]. Wigner proved (3) for three random variables,
but then he applied (3) to the EPR-Bohm experiment for correlated particles.
By using the condition of the precise anticorrelation (2) he wrote (3) in the
form:
P(a = +1, b′ = +1) +P(b = −1, c′ = +1) ≥ P(a = +1, c′ = +1) (4)
It is easy to see that (4) is violated for an appropriative choice of spin pro-
jectors.
By reasons presented in section 2.1 we would not like to use (4) as an
experimental test. But we neither can use directly (3). It is evident that, e.g.,
psychological observations can also have disturbance effect and we cannot
find a simultaneous probability distribution for some pairs of questions a
and b.
2.3. Inequality for conditional probabilities. As a simple conse-
quence of Theorem 1 we obtain:
Theorem 2. (“Bell’s inequality for conditional probabilities”). Let
a, b, c = ±1 be dichotomous symmetrically distributed random variables on a
single Kolmogorov space. Then the following inequality holds true:
P(a = +1/b = +1) +P(c = +1/b = −1) ≥ P(a = +1/c = +1) (5)
Proof. We have P(b = +1) = P(b = −1) = P(a = +1) = P(a = −1) =
P(c = +1) = P(c = −1) = 1/2.
Thus
P(a = +1/b = +1)+P(c = +1/b = −1) = 2P(a = +1, b = +1)+2P(c = +1, b = −1)
and
P(a = +1/c = +1) = 2P(a = +1, c = +1).
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Hence by (3) we get (5).
As was shown in [39], the inequality (5) is violated in quantum mechanics
(by 1/2-spin projections).
We underline again that the main distinguishing feature of (5) is the
presence of only conditional probabilities. Conditional probabilities can
always be calculated: we first ask the question b, then select all people who
answered “yes”, and then ask them the question a.
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